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Michael Moore’s two central theses in Causing, Aiding, 
and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability1 are, first, that 
we should recognize not just one, but four distinct types or 
“desert bases” of accomplice liability; and second, that once 
we have done this clearly, we will also see that accomplice 
liability is superfluous--that the criminal law does not need 
a distinct doctrine of complicity. 
The four kinds of accomplice who are properly held 
criminally liable are (a) “truly causal accomplices,”2 whose 
acts are indeed causes of the relevant resulting harm; (b) 
“necessary accomplices,”3 on whose acts or omissions the 
resulting harm counterfactually depends; (c) “chance-raising 
accomplices,”4 whose acts increase the chance that the harm 
will ensue but are neither causes of, nor counterfactually 
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necessary for, that harm’s occurrence; and (d) “subjectively 
culpable accomplices,”5 who seek to encourage or assist a 
principal, but whose acts actually make no difference at all.6  
But, Moore argues, the grounds for these types of accomplice 
liability are not peculiar to complicity; they are the four 
types of desert basis (causation, counterfactual dependence, 
chance-raising, purely subjective culpability) for criminal 
liability generally, of “principals” as much as of 
“accomplices.”  Those classed as accomplices are indeed, “in 
general and on average,”7 less blameworthy than those classed 
as principals (for instance, because they generally make a 
lesser causal contribution to the harm’s occurrence), but, 
according to Moore, this difference in degree of 
blameworthiness is only usual, rather than exceptionless, and 
is not enough to warrant a categorical distinction between 
“principals” and “accomplices.” 
 Moore’s distinctions between the four desert bases depend 
upon, and help to explicate further, the account of causation 
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that he has been developing over the last decade or so,8 but I 
will not be concerned with that account in this brief 
Response.  I will instead, in Part I, ask some questions about 
the third and fourth desert bases that Moore identifies, 
before arguing in Part II that there is still some room for a 
distinctive doctrine of complicity and thus for accomplice 
liability as a distinctive type of liability.  That argument 
will appeal to the mens rea of accomplice liability rather 
than to the actus reus (which is the focus of Moore’s own 
argument):  my claim is therefore that, even if all that Moore 
says about the actus reus is right, it does not warrant his 
conclusion that “aiding another to cause a harm is not a 
distinct basis for blame and punishment.”9 
I.  “Chance-Raising” and “Subjectively Culpable” Accomplices 
Even if we accept Moore’s arguments that counterfactual 
necessity is distinct from causation10 and that omissions, 
preventions, and “double preventions” are noncausal,11 it is 
still true that the acts or omissions of necessary 
accomplices, as well as those of “truly causal accomplices,” 
will figure in appropriate explanations of how the crime came 
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to be committed and of how the resultant harm came to ensue.  
P killed V (and V died) because, inter alia, D supplied P with 
the gun with which he shot V, or because D told P where he 
could find V.12  So too, P killed V (and V died) because, inter 
alia, D prevented the sending of the telegram that would have 
warned V and thus saved his life.13  There is thus a single 
crime, the killing of V, for which both P and D can be held 
responsible even if D’s contribution will usually have been 
less significant than P’s. 
Matters are quite different with “chance-raising” 
accomplices, since D’s activities will not necessarily figure 
in an explanation of how the crime came to be committed.  They 
will figure, of course, if P relied on them, even if they were 
not materially necessary:  if P was encouraged or confirmed in 
his effort to kill V by knowing that D had prevented the 
sending of the telegram that might have saved V’s life,14 or 
that D stood ready to shoot V if P’s shot missed,15 D’s 
contribution will figure in the explanation of V’s killing--
even if the telegram would not have saved V or even if P’s 
shot killed V.  But D’s liability does not, Moore argues, 
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require such knowledge on P’s part;16 and if P did not know 
that D had prevented the sending of a warning telegram that 
would not have saved V anyway, or that D was poised to shoot V 
if P missed, D will be absent from the explanation of P’s 
killing of V.  The same is true of “subjectively culpable 
accomplices,” whose efforts to assist or to encourage are 
unnoticed, ineffectual, or even counter-productive17--the crime 
will not have been committed because of what D did or tried to 
do. 
But in both of these types of case, Moore insists, D’s 
liability should anyway not depend on the actual commission of 
the crime.  D should be liable, on just the same basis, 
whether or not P actually kills V or even tries to kill V, 
since D’s liability should not depend on what P does or does 
not do.  Either D is liable as a culpable chance-raiser or 
risk-creator, if his action does increase the chance that the 
crime will be committed.  Or D should be liable--like those 
whose criminal attempts are so misguided that they do not in 
fact create any risk of harm18--as one who tries to commit a 
crime. 
I want to raise two questions about Moore’s view of these 
cases. First, doesn’t his account of the “chance-raising” 
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cases understate the culpable responsibility of some agents?  
If we believe, as I believe and as Moore at least used to 
believe,19 that “resulting harm” should make a difference to 
criminal liability--i.e. that one whose criminal attempt fails 
is properly convicted of a lesser offense and is properly 
liable to a lesser punishment than he would have been had the 
attempt succeeded--then, even if the crime is committed, D 
will be guilty of a lesser offense than P will be.  This seems 
to be true, on Moore’s account, even if D acts with P’s 
knowledge and approval, with the intention of doing what he 
can to ensure the successful commission of the crime, so long 
as his actions do not in fact contribute causally to, and are 
not in fact necessary for, its commission.  But surely a D who 
so purposefully associates himself with the crime, and who 
plays his part in making its successful commission more 
likely, should be held responsible for the crime along with P 
if it is actually committed?  Moore might reply that if D acts 
with P’s knowledge and approval, then D’s chance-raising 
contribution is at least likely to figure in the explanation 
of the crime’s successful commission.  I doubt that that is 
true:  P might allow D to play his role from a whole variety 
of motives, not all of which involve P’s relying on D for the 
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carrying through of the criminal project (e.g., pity, a desire 
to make D feel useful, laying the basis for later blackmail).  
But we can anyway focus on the case in which P does not know 
of what D is doing--a case in which D seeks unilaterally to 
associate himself with the crime.  Suppose that D really wants 
P to succeed in robbing the bank, but also knows that P is 
both careless and unwilling to accept help (at least from 
him).  So, without P’s knowledge, D takes steps to increase 
P’s chances of success--he appoints himself as lookout (P did 
not arrange one) or he arranges for a back-up getaway car.  In 
fact, all goes smoothly, and D’s precautions prove to have 
been unnecessary.  I am still inclined to say that D has made 
himself a party to the actual crime:  his liability should be 
not that of a mere chance-raiser who was (perhaps 
fortuitously) not actually responsible for the commission of 
the crime but, instead, that of a genuine party to the crime.  
By actively involving himself in this way, he makes himself a 
party to the robbery. 
The other question about Moore’s account of these cases 
(in particular the “subjectively culpable” cases) is whether 
it stretches criminal liability too far.  D sees P trying to 
break the window of what she believes to be V’s car and thinks 
that he is attempting to commit criminal damage.  Wanting to 
ingratiate herself with him, she gives him a hammer, intending 
thereby to assist his commission of that offense, and, with 
the help of the hammer, he breaks the car window.  As far as D 
Comment [n2]: AU:  I read “not just  . . 
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is concerned, she is a willing accomplice in his commission of 
the crime.  As far as the facts are concerned, however, there 
was no such crime for her to assist, since the car was P’s 
property (he had locked his keys inside it).  If liability can 
be based on grounds that are as purely “subjective,” as Moore 
(in agreement with the Model Penal Code) seems to allow, with 
no requirement for objective risk or wrongdoing, it seems that 
D is guilty of an attempted crime.20  This example leads us 
into the murky realms of “impossible attempts,” and in 
particular those, typified by the person who handles what she 
mistakenly believes to be stolen goods,21 in which an agent 
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5.01 (1985).  Section 5.01(1) makes it clear that liability 
depends not on the actual circumstances, but on the 
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stolen.  See also People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (N.Y. 
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acts in a mistaken belief such that, had it been true, she 
would have been committing a complete offense.  Now if that 
mistaken belief was integral to the agent’s purpose in acting 
as she did (such that, if she realized after the event that 
her belief was false, she would consider her enterprise a 
failure), she should indeed be liable for an attempt.  Had D 
passed P the hammer because she wanted to see V’s property 
damaged, she should indeed be liable in the way that Moore 
argues.  But in my version of the example her belief that the 
car is not P’s is merely incidental.  What is crucial to her 
enterprise of ingratiating herself with P is that she help him 
break the window of that car, not that she help him break the 
window of a car that does not belong to him.  The fact that it 
is P’s own car, then, does not render her enterprise a 
failure.  In such cases we find a proper application of the 
much misused slogan that an agent should not be criminally 
liable if she achieved all that she intended without 
committing an offense--the offense that she would have been 
committing had her belief been true.22  This is not to say that 
liability requires objective harm-causing or risk-creation:  
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if its being V’s car was integral to D’s purpose, for 
instance, she is properly held liable.23  Rather, it is to 
suggest that Moore, like the Model Penal Code, pushes the 
scope of inchoate criminal liability too far. 
The mistaken D discussed in the previous paragraph 
highlights a question that has been lurking throughout this 
discussion--a question about the kind of intention or mens rea 
that accomplice liability should require.  By focusing more 
directly on this question, we will be able to see why there is 
still room, despite Moore’s arguments, for accomplice 
liability as a distinctive type of liability. 
II. Intention, Foresight, and Complicity 
To simplify matters, we can focus on cases in which 
liability is grounded in the fact that D assists (or intends 
to assist) the commission of the target offense--focusing on 
assistance, rather than on solicitation or encouragement.  Two 
familiar questions about the appropriate mens rea arise.  
First, when it is said that D must intend to assist or 
facilitate P’s commission of the offense, should that be taken 
to require a “specific intent”--i.e., purpose--to assist or 
facilitate?  Or should it be enough that D realizes (or knows) 
that his intended action will in fact assist or facilitate?  
                                                                                                                                                 
23 But for a further argument that criminal attempts must 
objectively engage with the actual world, see Duff, supra note 
19, at 219-33.  
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As Moore notes,24 American law typically requires purpose,25 
whereas English law (which has signally failed to develop an 
adequately clear understanding of intention) requires only 
knowledge.26  Second, must D also “intend,” however intention 
is interpreted, that the offense be committed; or is it enough 
that he intends to assist P, even if he has no interest in 
whether P succeeds, or even hopes that P fails?27 
If D acts as he does in order to assist P’s commission of 
the offense, and does so in order to do what he can to ensure 
that the offense is successfully committed, then Moore’s 
overall argument seems to me (subject to the questions raised 
in the previous section) to succeed.  If I make it my purpose 
to assist the commission of an offense and act as I do in 
order that the offense will be committed, I make myself 
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nonderivatively responsible for it; my contribution might be 
less, as a matter of degree, than that of the person who 
finally does the deed, but my responsibility and liability are 
neither derivative from his, nor different in kind from his.  
Thus, if the law should require purpose, rather than merely 
knowledge, both as to the fact that what I do will assist the 
commission of the crime and as to its actual commission, it 
does not need a distinct type of accomplice liability.  
However, two concerns arise here:  first, there is good reason 
to extend the law more broadly than this, to capture some who 
do what they know will assist the commission of an offense 
although it is not their purpose to do so; and, second, this 
should be understood as a distinct type of liability. 
D supplies P with equipment or goods that he knows P 
intends to use for the commission of a crime (he supplies 
ingredients that he knows P will use to make explosives for a 
terrorist attack, a gun that he knows P will use to commit a 
robbery, a car that he knows P will drive while drunk or 
disqualified, etc.).  He claims, plausibly, that it was no 
part of his purpose to assist P’s commission of the offense; 
his purpose was merely to meet a friend’s request for the item 
in question or to earn the money that P offered for it.  
Should that save him from liability for involvement in P’s 
commission of the crime?28  Surely not.  As well as condemning 
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P, morally and legally, for his commission of the crime, we 
should be able to condemn D, both morally and legally, for his 
contribution to its commission.  However, although we should 
condemn them both, we should also draw a distinction of kind, 
rather than only of degree, between them for two reasons. 
First, if I act with the (direct) intention of assisting 
the commission of an offense, I cannot (absent a plea of 
infancy or insanity) deny responsibility for assisting it or 
for its commission.  If, however, I act in the knowledge that 
my action will assist its commission, there might be room to 
admit such knowledge while denying responsibility, by arguing 
that I had no prospective responsibility, in relation to that 
aspect of my action, that would give me reason to act 
differently.  A doctor who prescribes contraceptives to a girl 
of fifteen might know that this will facilitate the commission 
of an offense of sexual intercourse with a minor, since the 
girl and her 18-year-old boyfriend are more likely to have 
intercourse more often if she has the contraceptives.  But, 
the doctor might plausibly argue, she should not be held 
                                                                                                                                                       
cases not via any general doctrine of complicity, but through 
the creation of particular special offenses, for instance of 
supplying certain kinds of dangerous item.  Such offenses do 
have a place in a rational criminal code, but they do not 
capture the way in which D should also be held responsible in 
relation to the commission of the primary offense. 
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responsible for assisting its commission, since its 
prospective commission was not a factor that she should have 
considered in deciding whether to prescribe the contraceptive.  
Her sole concern was, as it should have been, to provide the 
treatment that was medically appropriate for her patient.29  
Part of what makes at least some such denials of 
responsibility morally plausible is, I suggest, the fact of 
intervening human agency:  it is not my business that what I 
do makes it easier for P to commit the crime partly because it 
is P’s business whether he commits the crime (whereas if I act 
with the intention of assisting P’s commission, I make it my 
business); it is up to P whether he commits the crime or not 
and--at least sometimes--I am not required to guide my actions 
by my knowledge of what P will do.30 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 See Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., 
(1986) 1 A.C. 112, 190 (H.L.) (on appeal from Eng.) (involving 
a case with similar facts); R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime 35-
36 (2007). Shopkeepers might offer an analogous, though 
morally less plausible, argument that what their customers do 
with the goods they sell is not their business.  Similarly, 
hosts who serve drinks to guests who will, they know, then 
drive home under the influence might analogously argue that it 
is the guests’, not the host’s, responsibility to avoid the 
commission of that offense. 
30 This is not to appeal to the libertarian view of 
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Second, even when D should not be allowed to deny 
responsibility for the foreseen fact that her action will 
assist P’s commission of an offense, and even when her action 
does make a genuine contribution to the commission of the 
offense, there still seems to be a categorical difference, 
rather than one only of degree, between D and P.  For D has 
not committed herself to the crime’s commission (as P commits 
himself by intending to commit the crime); she has not made 
the crime her own in the way that P does; she can still say 
that, in the end, it is up to P rather than to her whether the 
crime is committed.  This might not save her from criminal 
liability (often it should not).  It might not even make her 
offense less serious than P’s (for we must remember that 
differences that are worth marking are not always differences 
in degree of guilt). But it does make her relationship to the 
commission of the offense significantly different. 
These comments have, of necessity, been brief, gestural, 
and dogmatic, rather than developed, explained, and adequately 
defended.  I hope, however, that they have done enough to show 
that, despite the sophistication and plausibility of much of 
Moore’s argument, there might be more still to be said for a 
                                                                                                                                                       
“intervening causes” that Moore rightly criticizes.  Moore, 
supra note 1, at 408-12.  To say that it is up to P is not to 
portray P as an uncaused cause; it is to assert what is 
sometimes a morally plausible allocation of responsibility. 
16 
distinctive doctrine of accomplice liability than he allows. 
 
 
 
  
